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Fleischut: Fleischut: Work Made for Hire

WORK MADE FOR HIRE FOR THE
1990's
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,' the United States
Supreme Court determined what is a "work made for hire" under the
Copyright Act of 1976. The Court faced conflicting interpretations of the
law in various federal circuits. Resolution of the issue was critical in that
it determined the relative rights in copyrightable works created by independently contracting artists for commissioning parties.
Federal circuits have disagreed about whether an independent contractor
engaged to create specific copyrightable works is an "employee [acting]
within the scope of his or her employment" or a party "specially ordered
or commissioned" within section 101 of the 1976 Act. 2 A determination
that the artist is a section 101 "employee" is a determination that the
creation is a work made for hire and necessarily mandates, under section
201, that the commissioning party, absent a contrary written agreement,
"owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright." 3 If the artist is not

1. 109 S.Ct. 2166 (1989).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) states, in pertinent part:
A "work made for hire" is(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution
to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas,
if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that
the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose of
the foregoing sentence, a "supplementary work" is a work prepared for
publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the
purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords,
afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes,
musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes,
and indexes, and an "instructional text" is a literary, pictorial, or graphic
work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic
instructional activities.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1976) states, in pertinent part:
(b) Works Made for Hire.-In the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered
the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed other wise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all bf the
rights comprised in the copyright.
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an "employee," section 101 suggests that the creation can be a work made
for hire only if it fits within one of the narrow categories specified in
subsection (2) AND there is a written agreement that the creation is a
work made for hire.4 Due to the very limited scope of subsection (2), the
critical question is how broadly to interpret "employee" in section 101.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit accurately phrased the issue

as "whether Congress intended the term employee to encompass only
'regular' employees . .

or whether Congress intended the 1976 Act to
retain the somewhat more flexible definition of employee under the 1909
'5
Copyright Act."
II.

.,

WORK

MADE

FOR Hi.E BEFORE 1909

Prior to the Copyright Act of 1909, there existed a general presumption
that copyrightable works produced by employees in the scope of their
employment entitled the employers to the copyright. 6 This work made for
hire doctrine conferred upon the employer exclusive rights in the work in
question. The employee had "no more right than any stranger to copy or
reproduce" the product of his labor. 7 Presumptive copyright ownership in
the patron extended beyond general employees to works of an independent
contractor commissioned specifically to create the copyrightable subject
matter. 8 This created a heavy burden on the commissioned artist to rebut
the presumption with evidence of a contrary written agreement or acquiescence of the commissioning party in the artist's claim to copyright. 9
III.

TBE 1909 ACT AND Tim STRONG PREsUMnTON A WORK Is MADE
FOR HiRE

The definitional section of the 1909 version of the Copyright Act
expressly recognized the work for hire doctrine: "[The word 'author' shall
include an employer in the case of works for hire."' 0 Case law applying
the 1909 Act construed "employer" broadly enough to include a patron
of an independent contractor where the contractor created the work at the
"instance and expense" of the commissioning party." This rebuttable pre-

4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). See supra note 2 for text of section 101.
5. Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 944 (1986).
6. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903);
Colliery Eng'g Co. v. United Correspondence Schools Co., 94 F. 152 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.

1899).
7. Colliery, 94 F. at 153.
8. Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900).
9. Id. at 894-95.
10. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1909).
11. Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565,
567 (2d Cir. 1966).
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sumption, theref6re, worked against the independently contracting artist
anytime the "employer" initially solicited him;' 2 even if the creator was
a volunteer."3
IV.

TnE 1976 ACT: WHEN Is A WoRu

"MADE FoR HIn"?

The Copyright Act of 1976 reworked the text of the 1909 Act relating
to the work made for hire doctrine. Courts, however, have disagreed whether
the revisions represent substantial alterations of work made for hire principles established under the prior Act regarding independent contractors.
One case that held the revised Act was not a general overhaul of these
4
work made for hire principles was Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.1
The plaintiff in Aldon Accessories conceived of statuettes of mythological
creatures and then contracted with a Japanese company to design and
produce porcelain statuettes.' 5 Aldon also commissioned a Taiwanese company to produce brass statuettes derived generally from the porcelain statuettes, but with some additional artistic development.' 6 Spiegel obtained
brass statuettes from Taiwan that were similar to Aldon's. t7 The essence
of Spiegel's defense at the ensuing trial was that Aldon's statuettes were
not "prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment"
according to subsection (1) of the work made for hire definition in the
1976 Aci. Therefore, argued Spiegel, Aldon's claim to copyright, based on
its status as an employer, was invalid. 8 Both the district court 19 and the
court of appeals disagreed with Spiegel's narrow interpretation.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that "[n]othing
in the 1976 Act or its legislative history indicates that Congress intended
to dispense with this prior law applying the concepts of 'employee' and
'scope of employment. ' ' 20 The court believed that Congress directed any
narrowing of the work made for hire doctrine by the addition of subsection
(2) of the definition at those situations in which "direction and supervision"
by the commissioning party were absent. 2' In other cases involving inde-

12. Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1940).
13. Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
14. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
15. Id. at 549.
16. Id. at 550.
17. Id. at 554.
18. Id. at 550-52. Because there was no written instrument and the works
in question were statuettes, subsection (2) did not apply. Id.
19. 652 F. Supp. 1453 (D.D.C. 1987).
20. Aldon Accessories, 738 F.2d at 552 (citation omitted). Contra Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1494 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 109
S. Ct. 2166 (1989) ("We are less doubtful" that the legislative intent was not to
"radically revise 'work for hire' doctrine.").
21. Aldon Accessories, 738 F.2d at 552.
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pendent contractors, Congress left unaltered the fundamental principle that
the work made for hire doctrine applies when the commissioning party
engaged the artist to produce the work in question. 22 The parties, of course,
were free to rebut this presumption with, for example, evidence of an
agreement to the contrary.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit" agreed with the Second
Circuit's "compelling" 24 interpretation of work made for hire in Evans
Newton Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software. Evans Newton involved the
creation of computer software by an independent contractor per the commissioning parties specifications. 2 Repeating the reasoning of Aldon Accessories, the court determined that the programs were work made for
hire.?
This approach taken by the Second and Seventh Circuits was later
regarded as the "Aldon Accessories Compromise." Specifically, it was a
compromise between "conservative" and "literal" approaches to the work
made for hire doctrine. 27 The conservative view is that the 1976 Act did
little to change the work made for hire doctrine. The only change was to
provide extra protection in the situations enumerated in subsection (2) of
the work made for hire definition. 28 The literal view is that a creation is
a work made for hire only if the parties satisfy the narrow provisions of
subsection (2) or if a regular employee creates it per subsection (1).29 Courts
saw Aldon Accessories as a compromise because work made for hire would
still be applicable in situations not governed by subsection (2) in which
the contractor was not-so-independent; that is, the patron exercised sufficient
"supervision and control." 3 0 Thus, a court might still find a work made
for hire in cases of less-than-formal employees.
Although recognizing Aldon Accessories as a compromise, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Easter Seal Society v. Playboy Enterprises,3' rejected this and the conservative views and followed the literal
interpretation. In this case, entertainer Ronnie Kole, representing the Easter
Seal Society (Society), commissioned a New Orleans public television station
to tape a staged "Mardi Gras" parade and jam session for use in Society's

22. Id.
23. Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 944 (1986).
24. Id. at 894.
25. Id.at 891-93.
26. Id.at 894.
27. Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enter., 815 F.2d 323, 331 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988).
28. Id. at 331.
29. Id. at 329. See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text for further
development of this interpretation in the context of Easter Seal Society.

30. Easter Seal Society, 815 F.2d at 332.
31. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/9
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telethon. 32 The television station undertook all the technical work, finally
reducing the video product of six video cameras to a sixteen minute package
for Society. 33 A Canadian television producer later requested and received
a copy of the field tapes from the New Orleans station. 34 The Canadian
interest incorporated segments of the field tapes into "Candy, the Stripper,"
which was distributed to Playboy, Inc. and others and later shown nationally
on cable television." Society sued for copyright infringement. The district
court held only the field tapes were at issue in the suit and the New
Orleans station held the copyright on the field tapes. The court determined
that the director in charge of the videotaping was not Society's "employee"
and the tapes were not work made for hire within the meaning of the
1976 Copyright Act. 36 This determination, which the court of appeals
affirmed, was consistent with the literal interpretation. The videotapes were
not the product of Society's regular employee nor did they fit into one
of the narrow categories of subsection (2) of the Act's work made for
hire definition.
The court of appeals reasoned that this was the interpretation Congress
had in mind. It "would be anomalous to give" the artists covered by
subsection (2) extra protection yet leave other commissioned artists under
the traditional work made for hire umbrella.3 7 The Court in Easter Seal
Society, however, premised its analysis on a greater anomaly, namely, that
Congress meant, by including subsection (2), that work made for hire
principles protect patrons of commissioned works that they motivated the
creation of and paid for only if the works fit into the narrow categories
of subsection (2) AND the parties executed the requisite written agreement.
May computer programs, paintings, music and sculptures never be works
made for hire outside a formal employment situation, even by agreement?
Although absurd, this result seems to follow from the court's conclusion
in Easter Seal Society that "a work is 'made for hire' within the meaning
of the Copyright Act of 1976 if and only if the seller is an employee
within the meaning of agency law, or the buyer and seller comply with
the requirements of § 101(2)." '38 If computer programs, paintings, music
and sculptures may be works made for hire by agreement, then why did
Congress leave them out of subsection (2)? Were independently contracting
translators, now mentioned in subsection (2), not free to agree that their
work would be work made for hire under the old Act? Is that a new
privilege found only in the 1976 Act? One would think not. The purported

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at

324.
324-25.
325.
331.
334-35.
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"bright-line rule,"3 9 adopted in Easter Seal Society, by greatly narrowing
the scope of work made for hire, ignores the realities of copyrights in
commissioned works. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals for the40 Ninth
Circuit also adopted this interpretation in Dumas v. Gommerman.
V.

COMMUnTY FoR CREATIViE NON-VIOLENCE V. RED

4

1

Community for Creative Non-Violence (Community), an association
devoted to the causes of America's homeless, decided to sponsor a display
in the Pageant of Peace in Washington, D.C. 42 Community designed the
display to call attention to the plight of the homeless. 43 The association's
members determined that an appropriate display would be a modern Nativity
scene consisting of a homeless family huddled on a steam grate with steam
rising around them."4 The group also decided on the "Third World America"
title and the inscription "and still there is no room at the inn." ' 45 Mitch
Snyder, an agent for Community contacted Reid and entered into an oral
agreement with him in which Reid promised to donate his artistic services
46
and Community would pay the other costs.
Reid completed the statue and Community reimbursed him for his costs
and displayed the statue in Washington.47 The parties disagreed on plans
for an exhibition tour and necessary protection of the statue. 48 Both Reid
and Snyder, then, filed certificates of copyright registration.4 9 Community
brought suit seeking a declaration that it is the owner of the copyright
for the statue "Third World America" and to enjoin infringement of that
copyright.50
The district court embraced the view that it should interpret "employment" for copyright work made for hire purposes more expansively
than under general agency principlesA' The court concluded that "Third
World America" was a work made for hire under the "direct and supervise"
52
rationale.

39.
40.
41.
42.
(D.D.C.

Id. at 337.
865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1454
1987), rev'd, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166

(1989).
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

47. Id. at 1455.
48. Id. at 1456.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1454.
51. Id. at 1456.
52. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/9
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The district court's determination that this was work made for hire
was qualified with the language "in the absence of a writing to the
contrary.""3 One may interpret this qualification as an adherence to the
strong presumption favoring employers under traditional interpretation of
the 1909 Act.14 One might see strict adherence to the traditional view as
nonrecognition of any substantive difference in the work made for hire
doctrine between the 1909 and 1976 Acts, despite substantial textual revision.
This apparently was the reading given the district court's language on
appeal. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit likened
the district court's analysis to typical analysis under the 1909 Act. A
better reading is that the district court thought Reid's position, in relation
to Community, was so patently that of an "employee" within the meaning
of the 1976 Act that only the compelling evidence of a "writing to the

contrary" would have moved the court into Reid's corner. Unfortunately,
the court of appeals did not consider this interpretation.
The court of appeals, after thoroughly discussing the Aldon Accessories,
Evans Newton and Easter Seal Society cases, reversed the district court
6
and adopted the Easter Seal Society interpretation of work made for hire.1
Using general principles of agency law, the court of appeals denied Community exclusive copyright ownership finding Reid to be an independent
contractor, not an "employee" of Community within the meaning of section
101 of the 1976 Act.5 7 The court of appeals believed that the district court
was wrong in reading broad scope into work made for hire under the
current Copyright Act.5"
Does it follow from section 101 of the current Act that Congress
intended to depart so drastically from the deep-rooted fundamental notion
of copyright law that initiating and paying for the creation of a copyrightable
work entitles one to the copyright? One line of cases, headed by Aldon
Accessories and Evans Newton answered no, while other authority, namely
Easter Seal Society, Dumas and Community answered yes. The issue was,
therefore, ripe for clarification. Community appealed the work made for
hire determination to the United States Supreme Court, which granted
review.5 9

53. Id. at 1457.
54. See, e.g., Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co., 809 F.2d 366, 371 (7th
Cir. 1987).
55. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1493
(D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989). "[J]ust as courts and commentators
had blended these readings during the evolution of the work for hire doctrine
under the 1909 Act." Id.
56. Id. at 1494.
57. Id. The court of appeals did not go so far as to say that Reid was sole
owner of copyright in the sculpture, but remanded for a determination of whether
it qualified as a joint work. Id. at 1495.
58. Id.at 1487.
59. 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice
Marshall, affirmed the court of appeals and held that Community did not
have an exclusive copyright in "Third World America." 6 The Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to incorporate the traditional "right
to control" test into the work made for hire analysis because it would
impede the predictability of copyright ownership. 6' Nonetheless, the Court
listed "right to control" as one of at least thirteen factors for consideration
when determining whether one is an employee falling within the scope of
section 101(l).62 This author fails to see how adding twelve factors to the

"right to control" factor serves "Congress' paramount goal in revising the
63
1976 Act of enhancing predictability and certainty of copyright ownership."
To the contrary, the injection of agency law and its plethora of factors
only clouds the issue.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although hailed by some as a victory for artists, 64 the Supreme Court

decision in Community instead will have a catastrophic effect on freelance
artists. It will force publishers, advertisers and other employers to require
artists to enter oppressive contracts in which the artists surrender all rights
to their creations at the outset. If the free-lance artist rejects these terms,
employers are advised to refuse to commission out the work. Employers
will indeed be reluctant to contract work out to independent artists since

a sure way to retain copyright in works created at one's own expense and
motivation is to have it done in-house.
PAUL I. J.

FLEISCHUT

60. 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
61. Id. at 2176-77.

62. Id. at 2178-79.
63.

Id. at 2177.

64. Wash. Post, June 6, 1989, at B1, col. 4.
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